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JŲ1	JECT: Intelligence Collection
	i. One of the mest series limitations associated
wit	the SAM problem in North Vietnam has been the very
14 -	ited intelligence collection capability in that country. We
-	a no firm evidential basis on which to determine the number
al S	AM units in North Victoria, how they got there, or where
the	units or their support are located.
-	2. Informal presentations on current US collection
	Informal presentations on current to contection
CA (abilities using in-country assets have been given to the
Di	ector of the JCS Prong Tong Study Group by representatives
fre	TO CIA, SACSA, and CINCPAC. This group was commissioned
bur	the Injet Chiefe of Staff to examine the SAM problem in North
by VL	tuam and identify elements of concepts that would permit us
by Vu	the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the SAM problem in North tunn and identify elements of concepts that would permit US executions anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM
by Vid als	the Joint Chiefe of Staff to enamine the SAM problem in North team and identify elements of concepts that would permit US operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM exference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capa-
Victorial states	the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enamine the SAM problem in North- tuam and identify elements of concepts that would permit US operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM exference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capa- ty to avoide the kinds of information needed, nor does it
by Vic aix test bil	the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enamine the SAM problem in North team and identify elements of concepts that would permit US operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM exference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capatry to provide the kinds of information needed, nor does it in likely that the present program involving in-country teams
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by Vic aix test bil eec	the Joint Chiefs of Staff to emamine the SAM problem in North team and identify elements of concepts that would permit US operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM exference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capatry to provide the kinds of information needed, nor does it implies that the present program involving in-country teams I be able to improve the situation.
Victorial section will	the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enamine the SAM problem in North than and identify elements of concepts that would permit US operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM exference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capatry to provide the kinds of information needed, nor does it implies that the present program involving in-country teams I be able to improve the situation. 3. As previously discussed, this information is needed a high-priority basis, now and in the future. I hope that ever
Victorial sections will	the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enamine the SAM problem in North team and identify elements of concepts that would permit US operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM exference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capatry to provide the kinds of information needed, nor does it om likely that the present program involving in-country teams I be able to improve the situation.

EARLE G. WHEELER Chairman Joint Chiefe of Staff

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JCS review(s) completed.

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